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Abstract: A recent wave of scholarship attests that the liberal world order is under threat. 
While there is disagreement about the underlying reasons for this diagnosis, there are few 
attempts to further our understanding of how the liberal order can be reinvigorated. This 
article probes the potential of blockchain technology to promote international cooperation. 
Blockchain technology is a data structure that enables global governance stakeholders to 
establish decentralized governance systems which provide high-powered incentives for 
enhanced cooperation. By outlining the contours of a blockchain-based global governance 
system for climate policy, the article illustrates that blockchain technology holds theoretical 
promise to foster cooperation in three ways: leveraging new sources of information through 
blockchain-based prediction markets; allaying coordinating problems through reducing the 
cost of transactions for side payments; and allowing states and other global governance actors 
to make more credible commitments given guaranteed execution of blockchain-enabled smart 
contracts. By empowering local knowledge holders and non-state actors that traditionally 
lacked the means to coordinate efforts to influence global politics, blockchain technology also 
promises to advance an international order based on liberal values. In actuality, however, 
emerging blockchain-based global governance systems will fall short of the libertarian ideal 
of ‘fully-automated liberalism’ as their design and operation will remain under the shadow of 
power. 
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1.  Introduction 
Liberalism is a theory of international politics that emphasizes international institutions and 
global society as facilitators of peace and prosperity.
1
 While the liberal world order is 
currently under stress,
2
 there is little hope that this state of nature will change any time soon. 
International institutions—given the rise of emerging powers—are no longer underpinned by 
a single hegemon to which all other actors defer. Therefore, they are ever less able to act as 
focal points and thus fail to reduce the uncertainty that prevents deeper cooperation. 
Ironically, a return to hegemony would not promote liberal values. Hegemony tends to 
undermine itself as it creates rules that benefit the hegemon itself and that cannot prevent the 
hegemon from breaking the rules.
3
 A key challenge in liberal thought therefore is how to 
promote stability without the need for hegemony. 
This article probes whether recent technological advances—specifically blockchain 
technology—can promote institutionalized cooperation and whether the creation of 
blockchain-based governance systems would be normatively desirable from a liberal 
perspective. A blockchain is a database whose entries are cryptographically linked and which 
is distributed across participants of a peer-to-peer network. These design principles make a 
blockchain an incorruptible record of information that network participants can trust even 
without the existence of a central authority. Although blockchain is merely a data structure, it 
can be deployed to create so-called ‘smart contracts’. These contracts act autonomously in 
accordance with pre-coded rules, thereby exerting governance effects and potentially 
changing how societies interact in fundamental ways.
4
  
Using the example of climate change as an issue area, I sketch out the contours of a 
‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’ (DAO)—a virtual entity governed by a set of 
interrelated smart contracts—that represents a utopian vision of how climate governance 
would be implemented in a blockchain world. This climate DAO would not only implement 
key provisions of the Paris Agreement but also be adaptable to changing collective 
preferences over how global climate policy should be governed.  
This example provides the background for subsequent theoretical analysis, which shows that 
blockchain technology can promote international cooperation, under relatively benign 
assumptions. In essence, I show that smart contracts provide the building blocks for tapping 
unmet potential for cooperation in the following three ways: first, they help leverage the 
wisdom of crowds to validate events in the real world by facilitating prediction markets; 
second, they help allay distributional problems by automating issue linkage and side 
payments and realizing transaction cost savings; third, they allow stakeholders to make more 
credible commitments given the potential for elimination of uncertainty around contract 
enforcement.  
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 3 
The key theoretical contribution of my article is to demonstrate how blockchain technology 
operationalizes the liberal-institutionalist promise of promoting cooperation in an anarchic 
world.
5
 The hypothetical governance system that I describe here involves global governance 
actors—states, international organizations, and non-state actors—interacting through 
interlocking sets of smart contracts. This system promises to promote stability without the 
need for hegemony, relying on a decentralized system and self-governing contracts that do not 
require the upfront investment into centralized institutions typically undertaken by a 
hegemon. Once states submit themselves under such a system, they could reap the benefits of 
reduced uncertainty around enforcement, provided that they staked resources to underpin their 
commitments. States would also be able to reduce transaction costs by tapping into new 
sources of trusted information and settling their contractual obligations more efficiently. By 
leveraging new sources of information and resources from transnational actors with a staked 
interest in policy change, blockchain technology could promote cooperation even where 
opportunities for mutual gains have traditionally not been considered to exist.
6
 
Obviously, the ability of states to realize the cooperation benefits of blockchain technology 
depends on their general willingness to cooperate in pursuit of mutual gains, as presumed by 
neoliberal institutionalism. While the effectiveness of blockchain-based global governance 
hinges upon voluntary participation of state actors, a fundamental challenge is how to 
incentivize the participation of (especially) powerful states, which face the highest cost of 
submitting themselves under hard contractual obligations. In line with realist thought, it must 
be expected that such states would either opt out of blockchain-based governance, or would 
only make shallow commitments.
7
  
And yet, the real benefit of blockchain-based global governance is that buy-in from states is 
not necessary to promote cooperation among non-state actors toward achieving common 
objectives. This is because blockchain technology indeed allows any kind of stakeholder to 
make credible commitments, which generates stable expectations about their future behavior 
which in turn provides incentives for long-term investments in line with such commitments. I 
therefore argue that blockchain technology has potential to instantiate decentralized 
governance platforms that implement liberal ideals of a ‘fully-automated liberalism’—
whereby individual actors and the autonomous contracts that these actors create would work 
to achieve common objectives. By affording individual actors the possibility to securely 
transact with each other without the need for central authorities, blockchain technology tends 
to empower traditionally underprivileged actors. However, the definition of common 
objectives does not happen in a vacuum but would reflect the pre-existing power distribution. 
Blockchain technology itself thus has limited potential to fundamentally alter how power is 
distributed.  
My article makes three additional contributions. The first is to recognize the institution-like 
properties of blockchain technology. In particular, smart contracts under the aforementioned 
DAO—by removing uncertainty around enforcement for specific types of conditions—
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generate fundamentally different expectations about behavior than traditional forms of global 
governance, thereby meeting the definition of international institutions as sets of 
interconnected rules that shape actor behavior.
8
 Touching upon issues of contract 
enforcement, there is substantive literature on international courts.
9
 By examining smart 
contracts, my article provides a complementary approach to enforcement and discusses 
conditions under which they can solve enforcement problems. 
In addition, I contribute to a small literature examining the relationship between cooperation 
dilemmas, international institutions, and technologies.
10
 Specifically scholarship within 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) has examined how big data changes the nature of 
International Relations (IR) and related notions of power,
11
 further highlighting that the 
design of technologies like the internet is itself subject to global power struggles and mediated 
by socio-political norms.
12
 Some domestically-focused public policy research examined how 
technological innovations may disrupt organizational routines,
13
 while others emphasized how 
the growing availability of low-cost information technology facilitated efficiency-driven 
outsourcing of government services, raising concerns about democratic legitimacy and data 
protection.
14
 While these studies have looked at a range of technologies, no study has focused 
on blockchain technology, let alone attempted to examine whether and how it could help 
address cooperation dilemmas at the international level.  
Finally, my article is related to scholarly debates on global order.
15
 Here my contribution is to 
highlight that blockchain technology, specifically through algorithmic governance,
16
 renders 
the assumption of anarchy in the international system increasingly irrelevant. As 
McConaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon (2018) noted in this journal already, world politics is 
best understood as a set of ‘nested governance assemblages’, even though some relations 
between some actors may remain anarchical. Some blockchains exist and can affect global 
politics without the possibility of states to censor them, thus establishing governance at levels 
below the nation-state. In this way, it promises to empower weaker parties—less powerful 
states, non-government actors, and individuals—providing a tool to make global governance 
more transparent, if not accessible. Yet, although blockchain technology is considered by its 
libertarian proponents as an entry point for challenging existing hierarchies, the most-likely 
context in which it is used in global governance will not radically reconfigure existing 
hierarchies.  
 
 
                                                          
8
 Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; North 1990 
9
 Abbott and Snidal 2000; Simmons and Danner 2010; Voeten 2014 
10
 Campbell-Verduyn and Goguen 2018; Reinsberg 2018; Ruggie 1975 
11
 Zwitter 2015 
12
 DeNardis 2014; Jasanoff 2004; Just and Latzer 2017 
13
 Beckert 1999; Bendrath and Mueller 2011; Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002 
14
 Heeks and Bailur 2007; Zysman and Newman 2006 
15
 Krisch 2017; Mattern and Zarakol 2016; Musgrave and Nexon 2018 
16
 Just and Latzer 2017 
 5 
2.  Blockchain technology  
2.1.  What is blockchain technology? 
‘Blockchain technology’ has become a catch-all term for what basically is a bundle of pre-
existing technologies whose combination gives rise to socially powerful emergent properties. 
First and foremost, blockchain is a data structure—a digital ledger in which information is 
stored in blocks and linked to previous blocks.
17
 Blocks are linked via cryptography, allowing 
participants with read-access rights to verify that a transaction occurred while preserving data 
privacy. Blocks are transmitted to a distributed network of computers, thereby building 
resilience against attacks. To ensure that the data are synchronized, every blockchain needs a 
consensus mechanism. If a network participant wants to initiate a new transaction—creating a 
new block in the blockchain—all network participants must first accept its validity. As the 
integrity of a participant cannot be readily assumed, the consensus mechanism holds key to 
the sanctity of the data. 
It is important to realize that there is no single type of blockchain. Different blockchains vary 
with respect to rules of access and scope of distribution. In so-called ‘permissionless 
blockchains’, everyone can join the blockchain network and write consensus data. Such 
highly decentralized systems—due to their need for consensus, layers of encryption, and 
redundancy—reduce the speed with which transactions can be settled.18 In so-called 
‘permissioned blockchains’, the ability to manipulate the blockchain is restricted to pre-
approved participants who need off-network authentication and permission to write.
19
 
Permissions can be issued by a central authority; alternatively, consortium systems rely on the 
collective decision of participants, without involving a central authority. In a permissioned 
network, the identity of every participant is known. Permissioned blockchain networks do not 
abrogate the requirement that every node on the network perform all of the computation for 
the entire network, but they break this computation into particular segments and thereby 
increase overall performance and reduce transaction costs relative to permissionless 
blockchains.
20
 An example is a consortium of banks that use a private blockchain to settle 
derivatives. 
In addition, there are differences as to who is authorized to read information from a 
blockchain. In public blockchains, everyone with an internet-connect device and the related 
software can read-access the blockchain, whereas private blockchains require authentication 
for this purpose.
21
 Obviously, there is a correlation in the relationship between write-
restriction and read-restriction, although the two design dimensions are analytically separate. 
Their combination allows for a variety of blockchain designs that can be adapted to the 
specific nature of the given problems.  
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For example, Bitcoin—the first and best-known application of a blockchain—uses a public-
permissionless blockchain, conceived by its founder as a decentralized alternative to fiat 
money backed by central banks.
22
 This blockchain design reflects its purpose of enabling 
direct instantaneous transfer of value among participants in a fully decentralized manner—
without the need for participants to trust each other and without a need for a central authority 
to settle transactions.
23
 The downside of a completely open consensus mechanism is that 
fraud—in particular double-spending of bitcoins—must be made sufficiently unattractive. 
Bitcoin solves this by requiring ‘proof of work’—the costly computation of a complex 
cryptographic problem—which has been criticized for its high energy consumption.24  
Public-permissioned blockchains, which involve an element of authentication, have already 
been deployed for digital identity services, land registries, supply-chain management, 
decentralized file storage, and crowdfunding climate finance.
25
 These applications are often 
built upon Ethereum
26—a general-purpose blockchain that can settle any kind of digital 
transactions, not just cryptocurrency transfers. Aside from the proof-of-work consensus 
mechanism, Ethereum supports ‘proof of stake’, whereby a participant gets chosen to validate 
a proposed block with probability proportional to its staked deposit. If a proposed block does 
not get included in the blockchain, a validator loses its staked deposit.
27
 Yet another 
consensus mechanism—used by the World Bank in its recent sale of a blockchain bond—is 
‘proof of authority’, which lets trusted participants (such as the World Bank) manipulate the 
blockchain.
28
  
2.2.  Blockchain-enabled functionalities  
A key blockchain-enabled functionality that merits particular attention—given its potential 
use for global governance—is the ‘smart contract’,29 which facilitates, validates, and records 
transactions and agreements between multiple parties.
30
 Smart contracts allow many types of 
contractual clauses to be made self-executing, self-enforcing, or both.
31
 An example is a so-
called ‘multi-signature escrow’, whereby a contract executes when a specified quorum of 
participants have endorsed it through their digital signatures.
32
 In international relations, the 
equivalent of an escrow would be an arbitrator whose consent is required for a bilateral 
dispute to be settled if the two states disagree. If the contract specifies that a transaction needs 
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to be digitally signed by at least two participants, the arbitrator becomes the pivotal player if 
only one of two parties has provided its signature.
33
 Smart contracts hold most promise to 
reduce transaction costs for routine activities, for example to settle market transactions, where 
a buyer could use a smart contract to automatically release payment to a supplier of a good 
once the good has arrived at a specified location.
34
  
Smart contracts provide the building blocks for so-called decentralized applications (dApps), 
which essentially combine several smart contracts.
35
 An even more sophisticated 
application—‘decentralized autonomous organizations’ (DAOs)—link several smart contracts 
together to form a self-governing system.
36
 A DAO is a virtual entity that has a certain set of 
members which have the right to modify its code and spend its funds.
37
 For example, DAO 
members could decide to change quorums required for certain decisions.
38
 DAOs mimic 
existing collective entities such as international organizations, but use smart contracts for 
enforcement.
39
 DAOs have come under criticism after the infamous 2016 DAO hack, in 
which an attacker exploited a loophole in the coding protocol to siphon off DAO funds.
40
 In 
the DAO hack, no rule was agreed ex ante how to deal with attacks, which led to an ad-hoc 
human decision to fork the blockchain.
41
 In any DAO, though, parties to smart contracts could 
agree on how hacks can be addressed, even though these will vary in style.  
A common challenge for all smart contracts is that unless information is readily available on 
the blockchain, as for example for cryptocurrency transfers, they depend on external 
information feeds—so-called ‘oracles’—to bring the relevant information on the blockchain. 
With the rise of the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), tamper-proof smart devices are becoming 
increasingly important technical oracles.
42
 Another kind of oracle, facilitated by smart 
contracts, are ‘blockchain-based prediction markets’, which aggregate information about the 
occurrence of events in a non-manipulable way. While prediction markets have existed long 
before the arrival of blockchain, they were malfunctioning because no central authority could 
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commit to not exploit sensitive information for its own gain. As a result, reported information 
was not trustworthy. Blockchain technology, however, supports the proper functioning of 
prediction markets that leverage the ‘wisdom of crowds’.43 The decentralized nature of 
blockchain-based prediction markets implies that no one effectively controls information 
while information can be shared securely to validate certain events. An internal reputation 
system—drawn from game-theoretic approaches of mechanism design—incentivizes truthful 
reporting.
44
 Prediction markets are accurate because market participants stake real money on 
their predictions, while participants report valuable information given guaranteed payments 
through smart contracts.
45
 Smart contracts thus not only depend on prediction markets for 
their functionality but also ensure their viability.  
2.3.  Blockchain-based global governance  
The central idea of this paper is that blockchain technology—by facilitating transactions 
between actors and the autonomous contract agents that they create—is a decentralized 
mechanism for global governance, which can be defined as “systems of rule at all levels of 
human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.”46  
While the ability to govern has traditionally been confined to human beings, the rise of 
information and communication technologies, specifically computer algorithms, has come to 
challenge this view. Scholars have coined the term ‘algorithmic governance’ to refer to 
computer programs making authoritative decisions that construct reality and social order, 
based on predefined code and often using big data as input.
47
 Blockchain governance—as a 
subset of algorithmic governance—refers to those algorithms that run simultaneously on a 
distributed network of computers. Algorithmic governance can extend across national 
boundaries, for instance through algorithmic selection on the internet, or indeed through 
transnational relations on blockchain platforms.  
Competing perspectives exist to understand the implications of blockchain governance for 
global society. What unites them is their recognition that blockchain technology—by giving 
rise to autonomous agents who follow encoded scripts—exert a governing effect on social 
behavior. They can do so at least by altering the relative attractiveness of different behavioral 
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choices, if not by altering preferences toward cooperation themselves, given that actors come 
to understand that “code is law.”48  
Blockchain governance still is not an entirely accurate label for my subsequent analysis. It 
may refer to governance by the blockchain (i.e., cooperation between stakeholders through 
blockchain-based systems) and governance of the blockchain (i.e., how stakeholders take 
decisions about the rules by which the blockchain operates, the so-called ‘protocol’). To 
clarify that my main interest in this paper is in the ways in which blockchain technology can 
be used to further cooperation at the global level—rather than the principles by which 
blockchains themselves are governed—I henceforth use the term blockchain-based global 
governance, not blockchain governance.  
 
3.  Blockchain-based global governance for climate policy  
3.1.  Why climate governance? 
I demonstrate the implementation of blockchain-based global governance for the issue area of 
climate change. First of all, the combat against climate change is fraught with a diversity of 
complex cooperation problems, which allow for probing the different ways in which 
blockchain technology might help address such problems. In the domain of mitigation, a key 
challenge is to prevent states from free-riding on emission reductions of other states. In the 
domain of adaptation, states face an international distribution problem over how to spread the 
costs of financing the adaptation to the inevitable consequences of global warming. Both 
domains are not independent—as less ambitious collective mitigation efforts imply a greater 
need for more adaptation efforts specifically in the most vulnerable countries—which further 
complicates the bargaining process. Finally, the global fight against climate change also 
entails a distribution problem at the domestic level. Domestic bargains determine the viability 
of international bargains on climate policy, but in many countries the prospect for domestic 
bargains is bleak due to powerful lobbies with vested interests in the carbon economy. 
At the same time, the fight against climate change has brought to the fore an unparalleled 
diversity of actors with the capacity to take globally coordinated action, regardless of 
concurrent efforts led by national governments. Around the globe, sub-state actors—in 
particular cities—coordinate their efforts to hasten green urban transformations while at the 
same time lobbying their national governments to embrace de-carbonization.
49
 Cities have 
institutionalized their climate-related efforts through transgovernmental networks such as the 
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI), and the Coalition for Urban Transitions, which recently published an 
influential study illustrating how the development of carbon-neutral cities would help solve 
the climate crisis.
50
 There even is a proposal for a world parliament of cities that deliberates 
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and undertakes to do whatever they are willing to do voluntarily, but under traditional 
governance this entity would remain under the purview of states.
51
  
The climate regime is one that is rife with private-led initiatives using blockchain technology, 
upon which states could draw to operationalize their climate-related commitments. Besides 
global emissions trading markets,
52
 an important blockchain-based application is climate-
related crowdfunding. WeiFund provides an example of an open crowdfunding platform 
implemented through smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.
53
 Other projects seek to 
find innovative ways to mitigate the carbon footprint of blockchain technology itself, for 
instance by using transaction fees in the network to buy real-world carbon credits.
54
 Finally, 
blockchain technology is already being used for peer-to-peer energy trading. For example, 
SolarCoin is a community-based solar electricity reward program.
55
 Any solar installation can 
register with the network and receive SolarCoins for a verified amount of solar electricity 
produced. Users can spent coins for solar energy within the network or exchange them for fiat 
currencies.
56
  
The blossoming ecosystem of climate initiatives also reminds us that climate change—albeit 
plagued by cooperation problems among states—is the product of the sum of individual 
decisions and addressing it would likely require incentive systems that foremost change 
individual behavior. In the following, I highlight the key provisions of the Paris Agreement—
as the most recent accord that will govern climate-related cooperation in the foreseeable 
future—and describe how bringing them on the blockchain would create the contours of an 
emerging ‘climate DAO’ that would help stakeholders address underlying cooperation 
problems.  
3.2.  From the Paris Agreement to the climate DAO  
The Paris Agreement—the successor regime of the Kyoto Protocol—marks a momentous turn 
in the governance of climate change. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, it does not require states to 
make binding commitments, but instead takes a bottom-up approach in which states set their 
own targets—so-called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)—and communicate 
them internationally, reviewed by an expert panel.
57
 Hopes are that reputational concerns and 
network effects would entice states to commit to more ambitious NDCs.
58
  
Bringing the Paris Agreement on the blockchain would entail that member states first create a 
permissioned blockchain. Write-access would be restricted to pre-identified stakeholders such 
as states themselves and entrusted third parties—international organizations, non-
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governmental organizations, and expert bodies. States may decide to make some information 
visible to everyone outside the system. In particular, publicly recording the NDCs would meet 
the transparency requirements of the Paris Agreement (Article 4). Once the data is recorded 
on the blockchain, it is extremely hard to forge by anyone. This implies reduced 
administrative costs by obviating the need for the UNFCCC secretariat to keep a central 
record of such NDCs. 
With the ability to purchase carbon credits in other jurisdictions comes the need for ‘robust 
accounting’ that seeks to avoid double-counting of emission reductions (Article 6). The 
transparency-related functionalities of blockchain technology would make it a cost-effective 
solution to this problem, circumventing the need for a central organization to settle 
transactions of carbon credits.
59
 In fact, the Pacific Alliance nations are planning to create a 
blockchain-based monitoring system for emissions.
60
 
For other provisions of the Paris Agreement, a more extended use of blockchain technology is 
necessary. In particular, states would need to intertwine their blockchain with the ecosystem 
of permissionless blockchains in the climate sector. Technically, this can be implemented 
through “heterogeneous multi-chain frameworks,”61 which enable different kinds of 
consensus systems in a ‘federation’ to have trust-free access to each other. A common natural 
token, which might be called ‘greencoin’ and which would be created on top of a 
permissionless blockchain (such as Ethereum), would ensure that different blockchains would 
be interoperable. For example, states could use tokens to hire other stakeholders to perform 
certain tasks.  
One additional task such a blockchain-based governance system could address is to facilitate 
“results-based payments” for “activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation” (Article 5). To see how this would work in practice, imagine that anyone 
in a permissionless network connected to the system can earn greencoins by planting trees
62
 
(equivalent to ‘mining’ in the Bitcoin system); however, to ensure that greencoins have actual 
value, states could stake real money on them—through a smart contract residing on the 
permissioned blockchain that takes a monetary deposit from each state. If states fail to comply 
with their emission reduction targets, their deposit will be taken and redistributed as 
greencoins to individuals that have planted trees. Instead of planting trees, individuals could 
also buy up greencoins to support climate action. By increasing the exchange value of 
greencoins, these individuals would provide incentives for more rapid tree-planting. 
Obviously, tree-planting is just one example of climate-related activities; states could agree 
on a list of potential measures along with ways of verification and the incentive system 
underlying effective decentralized verification.  
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Given the elevated role of climate-related information (Article 13), there is a need for robust 
systems that produce information that can be trusted. Blockchain technology—particularly 
smart contracts—facilitate information provision by IoT devices and prediction markets, 
hence contributing to the verification of emission reductions and adaptation measures at the 
local level. Smart contracts also offer a way to securely reward local information providers 
with greencoins, thus meeting the Paris Agreement principle of “drawing on [the] knowledge 
of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems” (Article 7).  
The benefit of a common token in the blockchain system is to allow for a panoply of 
measures to be rewarded, while further promoting climate ambition (Article 6), even at the 
highest political levels. For example, consider the decision by US president Donald Trump to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, motivated with the expected job losses for carbon-
intensive industry workers. Major transnational corporations—including Apple, Google and 
Walmart—and even fossil fuel firms such as ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, and other firms outside 
the US criticized the decision and reaffirmed their support for the Paris Agreement.
63
 A series 
of smart contracts could have facilitated the compensation of affected workers using 
payments from transnational corporations benefiting from the low-carbon transition. Under 
the existing system, such a complex transnational arrangement would have involved high 
transaction costs without giving stakeholders the certainty that all transactions would settle.
64
  
Last but not least, the above blockchain-based system can be further developed into a climate 
DAO that would allow participants to alter procedural rules. To be sure, procedural clauses 
such as the requirement that 55 states representing 55% of global emissions must have ratified 
the Paris Agreement before it enters into force (Article 21) are easily translated into the 
language of smart contracts. Clauses like these could be changed by self-modifying pieces of 
code. Any country could propose to alter these rules, by releasing a transaction to vote for a 
proposal. States vote on proposals by spending their tokens on a given proposal. In other 
words, a token would operationalize a voting mechanism for on-chain governance, such that 
states would have incentives to invest more tokens for proposals about which they care more. 
The here-described climate DAO is a self-governed organization controlled by an 
incorruptible (yet collectively adjustable) set of rules, implemented as a set of smart contracts. 
Some encode contractual relationships between states, international organizations, and non-
state actors. Once established by stakeholders, smart contracts interact with each other and 
with other stakeholders according to their predefined code, without the need for human 
triggers.
65
 For example, some contracts may pay smart devices for feeding critical information 
into the system. In the same way, smart contracts can be fully self-executing, thereby 
punishing state behavior that violates a previously made commitment. International 
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cooperation would thus come about through the interaction of (in many cases fully 
autonomous) smart contracts.  
 
4.  Theoretical implications  
Having laid out the principal design of blockchain-based global governance with an 
illustration of a climate DAO, I now discuss the implications of such a governance system for 
international cooperation, normative issues, and global order.   
4.1.  Cooperation  
Blockchain technology promises to promote international cooperation in three ways. First, it 
could address information problems by leveraging distributed consensus to generate reliable 
information. Second, it would offer a secure and efficient way of making side payments as 
part of agreements, hence allaying distribution problems. Third, blockchain technology could 
enhance the credibility of state commitments by allowing for guaranteed execution of 
intergovernmental contracts under certain conditions. I discuss each of these promises in more 
detail below. 
Leveraging new information  
Blockchain technology may be deployed to alleviate information problems, given the way it 
represents data and the difficulty to tamper with the data. In general, blockchain technology is 
particularly useful where participants need to access, verify, send, or store information 
securely, but where a trusted central authority for that purpose is not readily available.
66
 It 
also holds significant promise wherever verification that an event happened is necessary but 
prohibitively costly.  
While information that has once been recorded on the blockchain is resistant to manipulation, 
a remaining challenge is how to ensure the accuracy of such information in the first place. The 
usefulness of blockchain technology in this regard depends on the type of information to be 
stored. Efficiency gains are largest for ‘on-chain events’—the ones that occur within the 
blockchain system, such as transfer of digital currency. The more challenging case refers to 
‘off-chain events’—those that occur in the real world but are not yet represented on the 
blockchain. To verify off-chain events, states can use oracles. For instance, satellite imagery 
is a technological oracle that can verify preservation of rain forest areas that countries might 
have promised to undertake. A blockchain-based prediction market is another type of oracle, 
allowing participants to ascertain the probability that a specified event happened. As the 
international system is characterized by a paucity of information that is often untrustworthy, 
states which have the most interest in accurate information will act as market makers and 
provide liquidity to initiate a prediction market.    
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One might contend that there are enough trusted parties who facilitate state cooperation by 
serving as mediators, validators, and knowledge producers.
67
 However, stakeholders may not 
want to delegate authority to such parties, as those may abuse this power to advance their own 
agendas. For instance, as noted by principal-agent literature, international organizations, if 
endowed with too much delegated authority, can overstep their mandates and be prone to 
uncontrolled budget growth.
68
 In such contexts, oracles such as IoT devices and decentralized 
prediction markets provide an alternative source of trusted information.  
And yet, for a range of information types, there is a continued need for trusted third parties, 
such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and expert bodies.
69
 
Traditional third parties may be superior to decentralized information providers specifically 
for highly technical issues, such as monetary policy-making, where it is unlikely that public 
prediction markets will have many reporters because individuals lack the expertise to make 
informed bets. In this case, a technocratic international organization may be the better 
choice.
70
  
Allaying distribution problems 
If—as some scholars argue—distributional problems are the main impediment to cooperation, 
the primary role of institutions is not to prevent cheating (because a once-chosen equilibrium 
is self-enforcing) but to help states choose among multiple equilibria with different 
distributional implications.
71
 As argued by neoliberal institutionalists, institutions help states 
to do so by facilitating issue linkage and side payments.
72
  
Blockchain technology, particularly smart contracts, can be used to streamline these 
processes. Each state would encode in a smart contract what it would be willing to surrender 
in exchange for some benefit that another state would grant. The blockchain as a decentralized 
ledger of such commitments would then serve as ‘market maker’—like a trading computer on 
the stock market—and identify the Pareto-optimal allocation of benefits. Presumably, the 
efficiency gains from using blockchains for this purpose are not large but increasing in the 
extent to which state bargaining follows a standardized protocol, occurs rather frequently, and 
involves easily traceable or digital assets. Multilateral trade negotiations provide a case in 
point. These negotiations have long followed an informal procedure by which the most 
powerful states define the agenda and reach agreement in informal minilateral settings that 
they seek to extend to the membership at large. As the ambassador of Costa Rica to the WTO 
stated, trade policy “is still being negotiated in a [...] widely inefficient manner”73—as it fails 
to search the bargaining space for globally optimal deals that make all countries better off. 
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Just like trade negotiations, climate-related negotiations are complex and the unmet potential 
for Pareto-increasing policy choices is relatively high.  
Blockchain technology can also solve gridlock between states by breaking up the domestic 
bargains that constrain governments to commit to cooperative policies at the international 
level.
74
 This is particularly relevant when non-state actors—specifically the ones that reside 
in other jurisdictions—have significant resources available to incentivize pro-cooperation 
behavior of domestically-constrained governments, as the earlier thought experiment on the 
US exit from Paris illustrated. By allowing transnational actors to devise smart contracts that 
promise to pay states for compliance, the resulting blockchain ecosystem would address the 
staking problem by contributing money from sources other than states.  
In sum, blockchain technology has potential to allay distributional problems by offering a way 
to organize issue linkage and side payments more efficiently through smart contracts. In the 
context of coordination problems, the rigidity of such contracts is advantageous because once 
they settle a proposed transaction, states have no incentives to rewind it. In addition, a 
blockchain-based governance ecosystem promises to shift the Pareto frontier by making 
available financial resources from non-state actors to incentivize government cooperation.  
Making commitments more credible 
A final promise of blockchain technology is to allow states to make credible commitments—
as states would be able to design contracts whose execution is guaranteed. There are two 
reasons to believe that states have interests to do so. First, governments—especially those 
with limited tenure such as democratically elected ones—have incentives to lock in policy. By 
adopting institutions from which exit is costly, they can effectively tie the hands of their 
successors and limit policy reversals—a strategy that is well known in the context of 
delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank.
75
 Second, lack of enforcement 
creates incentives to renege on commitments, which undermines their strength.
76
 Guaranteed 
enforcement allows states to make more credible commitments to each other because 
uncertainty around enforcement is removed. As smart contracts can be programmed not to 
enter into force until a quorum of states complies with them, any state wishing to make a 
stronger commitment does not inevitably expose itself to undue risk of being exploited by 
other states.77  
This is a potential advantage over currently-existing institutions. Even international 
organizations—the most centralized entities in world politics with considerable degrees of 
delegated authority—are far from being direct enforcers of rules but do so indirectly by 
relying on incentives, persuasion, and learning.
78
 International organizations often serve as 
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commitment devices ex ante, for instance through costly accession procedures,
79
 which are 
effectively realized costs. International organizations also have limited capacities to enforce 
state commitments ex post, whereas smart contracts allow for guaranteed punishment when a 
state violates a previously made commitment.  
For smart contracts to effectively enhance the credibility of commitments, states must have 
staked resources upon them that states would lose if they did not follow through on their 
promises. For incumbents who contemplate about a commitment, the ability of the smart 
contact to hold funds securely in custody should reassure them to make a deposit that it might 
otherwise not be willing to make vis-à-vis a less trustworthy intermediary.80 Future 
incumbents who inherit a stake from their predecessor are effectively constrained by the smart 
contract because non-compliance will lead to loss of deposit. Full automation of the 
commitment–compliance process requires that contract conditions can be unambiguously 
evaluated, which however is the case only for blockchain events (although the rise of IoT 
devices and prediction markets facilitated by smart contracts enlarges the set of contract 
conditions that are interpretable). Under such conditions, problems of moral hazard would be 
eliminated, and costs of verification and enforcement of promises would be reduced.  
If enforcement problems and the related lack of credible commitment inhibit 
intergovernmental cooperation, blockchain technology, and particularly smart contracts, hold 
promise to promote cooperation. From a merely technical perspective, the effectiveness of 
many smart contracts may be limited by their reliance on real-world authorities and their own 
contractual rigidity that is essential for their efficiency. The first problem may become more 
manageable in the future, considering the increasing availability of smart devices and 
blockchain-based prediction markets, which serve as information input devices to the 
blockchain. A crucial task though would be to increase the resilience of these input devices to 
manipulation, as they are the key ‘infostructures’ of the blockchain age.81  
The second problem is more severe. In fact, there is an inherent tradeoff between efficiency 
afforded by a smart contract and the flexibility that the language of ambiguous contracts 
provides.
82
 Smart contracts are fully efficient only if they can execute automatically. To that 
end, they must be ‘complete contracts’83—specifying all possible contingencies upfront. Even 
if this was feasible, it would be costly for complex issues, thus increasing the cost of ex ante 
contract design. More importantly, complete contracts may not be collectively desirable. 
Governance actors may not want to be collectively bound by a formal treaty provision if 
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circumstances change unexpectedly.
84
 Indeed, many international agreements include escape 
clauses, treaty reservations, non-legally binding provisions, and procedural standards that 
need further interpretation. This is not accidental but a deliberate design choice by states 
which desire flexibility, especially when uncertainty about the state of the world is high.
85
 
Where blockchain transactions require enforcement in the real world, the blockchain is as 
ineffective as conventional international law if powerful states renege on their promises in the 
absence of a world government. And even where execution is possible as in the case of on-
chain events, the strength of guaranteed execution might actually turn into a weakness: states 
anticipating guaranteed punishment for reneging might be unwilling to make ambitious 
commitments in the first place. This implies that state commitments under smart contracts 
will likely be trivial, or participation in blockchain-based governance would be limited to 
states that are willing to comply or that expect to comply with contract obligations.
86
  
Cross-cutting considerations 
Albeit analytically distinct, the above mechanisms through which blockchain technology can 
enhance cooperation are interrelated. Smart contracts are key for the effective functioning of 
oracles, specifically prediction markets. Oracles are sources of new information that would 
help enlarge the set of self-executing smart contracts, thus promoting cooperation by 
eliminating enforcement uncertainty and realizing gains from reducing the costs of settling 
contracts. For complex multilateral bargaining situations where states have not identified 
Pareto-optimal policy outcomes, smart contracts residing on the blockchain could help states 
to identify mutually preferable bargaining outcomes, thereby reducing transaction costs of 
policy bargaining and streamlining agreement execution. This suggests that blockchain 
technology may enhance cooperation by altering state preferences over strategies.
87
 
An even more important benefit of blockchain technology is its potential to alter state 
preferences over outcomes. In some issue areas, there are (resourceful) domestic stakeholders 
with pro-cooperation preferences who can use blockchain technology to incentivize 
recalcitrant governments to cooperate, or, failing that, circumvent them altogether. This is 
important as it shows that—given the technology—there is no longer a need for a hegemon to 
uphold cooperation. At the same time, cooperation would become truly transnational, thus 
coming close to the ‘open liberal order’ that liberal observers have envisioned.88 A good 
example to illustrate this is the recent announcement by Microsoft to invest USD 1 billion 
over the next decade to become a ‘carbon-negative enterprise’.89 To help underpin the 
credibility of this statement, Microsoft could encode this commitment in a smart contract with 
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an appropriate stake. This would make powerful players like Microsoft truly accountable, 
while providing certainty for other (less powerful) actors to make long-term investments into 
technologies that would help Microsoft achieve its commitment.  
4.2.  Normative implications—power and legitimacy  
Even if blockchain technology could help promote cooperation, a remaining issue is whether 
its use would be normatively desirable. Liberalism provides a normative standard against 
which to judge blockchain-based global governance imaginaries. As a tradition of thought, 
liberalism emphasizes individual freedom of choice, equality of individuals, and protection 
against abuse of power. Early liberal thinkers such as Immanuel Kant argued that if it was not 
for autocratic rulers, human beings and their nation-states would live in harmony with each 
other. Following from thinkers such as Abbé Saint-Pierre,
90
 Giuseppe Mazzini,
91
 and 
Woodrow Wilson,
92
 liberalists posit that rulers could bind themselves using international 
institutions,
93
 which exist to promote economic prosperity and sustain peace and thus make 
everyone better off.  
Blockchain technology seems to be well-placed to promote ‘fully-automated liberalism’—a 
state of nature where participants undertake mutually beneficial transactions while furthering 
the collective goals of global society.
94
 Its normative appeal is that all actors, even the most 
powerful ones, would be constrained by their own promises encoded within smart contracts. 
The fundamental problem obviously is how to incentivize powerful actors to make such hard 
commitments. Aside from the technical difficulties to generate self-enforcing contracts 
discussed earlier, blockchain-based global governance would unlikely be egalitarian but 
imbued by pre-existing power asymmetries. Like other technologies, blockchains are agnostic 
about the content of the computer code that runs on them. As technologies are always 
embedded in specific social contexts, blockchain technology, too, will be deployed in ways 
that reflect existing power structures. Thus, as I will argue, even if a blockchain-based 
governance system like the climate DAO were to be implemented, it would fall short of 
liberal ideals as it cannot fundamentally change the pre-existing power distribution.  
That said, fully-automated liberalism could help make global governance more liberal. Even 
permissioned blockchains, controlled by centralized actors, can empower traditionally 
underprivileged groups through the broadened set of opportunities for low-cost transnational 
interactions. For instance, blockchain-based remittance payments are cheaper than traditional 
payment systems.
95
 The related transaction cost savings generate real income growth that 
might empower marginalized actors. As described in the example of the climate DAO, 
marginalized actors will also be empowered through greencoin rewards for their local actions 
to further collective climate goals. As bearers of local knowledge, marginalized groups would 
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also be empowered as they hold relevant information on which blockchain-based prediction 
markets depend. Yet, the possibility to earn greencoins is predisposed on aligned interests of 
states or other resourceful actors that establish such high-powered incentive schemes.  
Permissionless blockchains even promise to directly empower individual citizens by 
disintermediating the roles of centralized actors and processes that traditionally underpin 
global governance. Blockchain may offer an entry point for weaker actors—specifically non-
state actors—to challenge existing hierarchies, because it affords them a coordination device 
to organize decentralized action toward a collective goal without relying on recalcitrant 
governments. Such disintermediation, however, may not be normatively desirable if states are 
benevolent;
96
 however, it would be desirable if states failed to be responsive to citizens, who 
then would need to rely on the blockchain as an alternative decentralized governance 
mechanism to affect global politics. Global carbon emissions trading market provides a case 
in point. Even without institutional support from governments, non-state actors would be able 
to trade carbon emissions through a blockchain-based governance system, although the 
system would be more effective with government support. 
Despite some undeniable benefits in terms of empowering non-state actors, blockchain 
technology is unlikely to overcome existing hierarchies in the international system. In effect, 
it may even produce new kinds of power asymmetries. Blockchain technology will challenge 
neither the primacy of states in global governance nor the preponderance of powerful states 
within the state community. If all states were to voluntarily participate in blockchain-based 
global governance, they would devise contracts with little obligation, as they must fear 
guaranteed punishment by smart contracts finding states to be violating their commitments.
97
 
If the DAO only entailed contracts with hard obligations, (especially) powerful countries 
would not be willing to join the DAO, thus limiting its overall effectiveness. The promise of 
harder commitments that smart contracts can afford thus has the drawback of leaving those 
states out of its jurisdiction which would need to be constrained the most. The only way to 
incentivize participation by powerful states—aside from collective mechanisms to allow them 
to renege on their commitments
98
 which are not easily achieved under crypto-law—is to 
unlock additional benefits for them, such as credible commitments for burden-sharing 
investments into the liberal order from non-state actors. 
At the organization level—pertaining to the governance of blockchains—an increasing use of 
blockchain technology for global governance creates new power imbalances. The blockchain 
protocol is often hard-wired by developers, without much input from end-users. Knowledge to 
set up blockchain platforms is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of tech-savvy 
people, who can use it to their advantage on design issues—similar to how international 
bureaucrats can exploit their expertise for their own gain when designing new institutional 
progeny for member states.
99
 Hence, growing demand for blockchain-empowered systems to 
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govern global challenges will likely empower a transnational elite of software developers at 
the expense of other societal groups.
100
  
One might be tempted to argue that whether blockchain technology will alter the distribution 
of power in the international system crucially depends on their design. Permissionless 
blockchains promise to empower non-state actors by disintermediating central actors, 
although non-state actors can benefit even more from a hierarchically ordered governance 
system that intertwines these blockchains with permissioned blockchains that central actors 
would create to harness incentivized individual action within the framework of promoting 
international cooperation. For permissioned blockchains—typically controlled by central 
actors like states—the level of empowerment of non-state actors is likely to be limited. A 
unique focus on design for assessing power issues is limiting nonetheless because the design 
of blockchains occurs in the shadow of power and therefore will reflect existing hierarchies, 
with limited potential to make global politics more egalitarian. Considering the implications 
of blockchain technology for global order, it therefore seems that—as a new technology for 
decentralized governance—blockchain technology somewhat flattens hierarchies by allowing 
new actors to influence global politics more effectively than under current arrangements; 
however, states maintain the ability to control global governance by co-opting the technology 
to advance their own ends. Therefore, it seems that the rationalist view—expecting 
blockchain technology to be used by powerful actors to advance their predetermined 
interests—is not fully convincing. Instead, in line with a constructivist view, governance by 
blockchain acts to reshape that activity and its meaning.
101
 This coincides with a co-
evolutionary perspective on technological change, which argues that technology is not just 
formed by society but can also be active as structure, institution, or actor.
102
  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This article probed whether and how blockchain technology could enhance global 
governance, with an illustration for climate governance. While existing studies emphasize the 
apparent benefits of the technology related to information-sharing within traditional global 
governance structures,
103
 this article sketched out the contours of a ‘Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization’ (DAO) comprising various sets of stakeholders interacting 
through smart contracts to achieve policy goals and to define the process by which future 
policy decisions will be made. Such a DAO would be implementable with available 
blockchain technology.  
My theoretical analysis has shown that blockchain-enabled functionalities like smart contracts 
could be deployed to promote cooperation in three ways: first, by leveraging collective 
information feeds, thereby helping resolve uncertainty about the state of world and state 
behaviors; second, to allay distribution problems in an efficient manner; and third, to allow 
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states and other global governance actors to make more credible commitments to each other. 
Blockchain technology promises to offer new avenues for states to enlarge the set of 
circumstances under which they are willing to cooperate given ex ante preferences, for 
instance by leveraging new sources of information and by reducing downstream transaction 
costs that free up resources to allay distribution problems. Hence, even where scholars have 
traditionally thought that prospects of cooperation are grim—where states already live on the 
‘Pareto frontier’104—a once-established blockchain-based global governance system with the 
aforementioned functionalities could enlarge the scope for cooperation. 
My article also interrogated whether blockchain-based global governance would be desirable. 
While over-optimism that blockchain governance could instill liberal ideals into global 
politics must be dampened, there are undeniable benefits of blockchain-based governance 
compared to traditional global governance. The benefits of a blockchain-based governance 
system would be enhanced public accountability, through unrestricted read-only access to the 
blockchain, as well as increased democratic legitimacy, by including relevant stakeholders 
(such as NGOs) as participants in the consensus mechanism and by facilitating the transition 
from the current system in which power is distributed according to (largely non-transparent) 
lobbying contributions toward blockchain-based governance where parties stake publicly for 
their interests. In addition, traditionally underprivileged stakeholders would likely be 
empowered as they hold important local information that would feed the oracles on which 
smart contracts depend to settle transactions. Blockchain technology also affords these 
stakeholders an opportunity to securely transact with each other, without relying on central 
authorities for this purpose. The costs of blockchain-based global governance are related to 
the well-known IR result that institutional design occurs in the shadow of power. States have 
incentives to establish some blockchain-based governance systems given that they can be 
designed not to threaten their own survival.
105
 This suggests the continued relevance of the 
liberal-institutionalist argument that a functional theory of cooperation is incomplete without 
consideration of political structures, specifically the distribution of power. It also suggests that 
blockchain-based global governance is unlikely to fulfill the normative ideal of ‘fully-
automated liberalism’ in the shape under which it would ever come to fruition. 
While my case study considered climate policy, it might be useful to probe its generalizability 
to other issue areas. In many issue areas, blockchain-based governance would run counter to 
the interests of powerful actors, specifically influential states that would lose opportunities for 
power exercise if global affairs were governed by crypto-law. In some instances, smart 
contracts may also be collectively unprofitable because states would face high costs from the 
inflexibility that they imply—especially under conditions of uncertainty about the state of the 
world. Climate governance—given favorable conditions such as issue complexity and unmet 
potential for cooperation, resourceful domestic stakeholders with pro-cooperation preferences, 
and a need for information systems that can validate climate-related events and policy 
measures—thus seems to be a most-likely case where a blockchain-based system is not 
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completely out of question. Other issue areas with similar features and thus similar 
amenability to blockchain-based governance include trade, finance, and development. 
Four issues merit particular attention in future research. First, who benefits and who loses 
from adopting blockchain-based global governance? A detailed answer to this question would 
provide further indication of how likely such adoption is under the given power distribution. 
The distributional consequences for states are not obvious, not least because they would hinge 
on the initial allocation of voting rights in blockchain-based governance systems. A once-
established blockchain-based governance system would make the abuse of power more costly, 
while allowing for bottom-up governance by weaker actors, like developing countries and 
non-governmental organizations, through smart contracts. A related issue is how blockchain-
based governance affects principal-agent relationships between international organizations 
and member states.
106
 Blockchain technology could affect these relationships in multiple 
ways, depending on which functionalities are adopted. At the very least, international 
organizations would become more accountable to states to the extent that states would be able 
to more easily monitor the work of these organizations if they recorded their operations on the 
blockchain. At the extreme, under fully-automated liberalism, international organizations 
would be tasked primarily with validating external events and providing technical assistance, 
at the expense of fiduciary oversight roles and (possibly) policy coordination, which would be 
handled more efficiently through smart contracts. Clearly, this disintermediation potential of 
blockchains would raise opposition from international organizations. 
A second issue—related to the first one—pertains to the governance of blockchain 
protocols.
107
 For example, while the Bitcoin network implies fully decentralized governance, 
the governance of the Bitcoin protocol is highly centralized—controlled by its 
developers
108—and the Bitcoin consensus mechanism incentivizes the creation of centralized 
mining pools. The DAO represents a departure from centralized control over the blockchain 
protocol. Its internal governance rules can be altered through quasi-democratic consensus—
with voting rights depending on the ownership of tokens. For some, the 2016 DAO hack 
proved the failure of the DAO concept,
109
 while for others, the resorting to off-chain solutions 
represented a “meta-governance structure” that was “off-chain” but “bound by the design of 
the technology.”110 Ultimately, the responsibility rests with actors collectively to decide 
through which mechanisms governance rules can be adapted. In this context, more research 
would be necessary to explore what kind of quorum is needed to simultaneously avoid control 
of the network by a cartel of powerful participants, while also preventing deadlock where a 
minority of nodes censor all new members. 
A third area are challenges arising from the lack of interoperability with the off-chain world. 
A key challenge is that many oracles are centralized, which makes them vulnerable as single 
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points of failure while potentially undermining the veracity of data input to the blockchain. 
However, there are promising attempts to solve the ‘oracle problem’. For example, Chainlink 
orchestrates a decentralized network of oracles relying on multiple sources of external 
information to evaluate queries from smart contracts in a trustworthy manner.
111
 Even if the 
oracle problem can be solved, there remains the question of how to constrain abusive uses of 
‘predictive analytics’ afforded by the growing availability of ‘big data’ from the blockchain. 
This issue tends to be overlooked by scholarship hailing the ever-closer integration of 
blockchain with IoT devices.
112
 While appropriate blockchain designs can likely mitigate this 
problem, more research is necessary. 
A final area of inquiry would take up the challenge of developing metrics on the relative 
effectiveness of blockchain-based global governance against its present alternative. Such an 
analysis will remain impossible pending the actual use of blockchain and the generation of 
related data. If blockchain-based global governance were to be implemented, the focus of 
inquiry would be to explain why some states participate in it while other states do not. In this 
regard, existing research in political economy—notably on the adoption of new technologies 
such as the internet
113—provides testable arguments. While states cannot prevent individuals 
from using permissionless blockchains (unless they completely shut down the internet, which 
could then prompt individuals to use satellite technologies to connect to it), their participation 
in permissioned blockchains is voluntary. A straightforward prediction would be that demand 
for permissionless blockchains by non-state actors is higher in autocracies, while autocratic 
governments are less likely to join permissioned blockchains as their disutility of being 
exposed to transparency is greater. This exemplary discussion shows that the unique features 
of blockchain technology provide for new avenues of testing pertinent theories of 
international relations and domestic politics.   
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